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Dynamic Game Theory Readings

by David K. Levine

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Basic concepts of equilibrium in games

NOTES: Review of Game Theory Basic concepts of equilibrium in games

BOOK: Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, Game Theory, ch. 1, 2, 3 and 6

  1. Aumann, R. J. [1976]: "Agreeing to Disagree," Annals of Statistics, 4: 1236-1239
  2. Cho, I. and D. M. Kreps [1987]: "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102: issue 2: 179-221
  3. Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps and D. K. Levine [1988]: "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, 44: 354-380

Repeated Games with a Long Run and Short Run Player

NOTES: Discrete Dynamic Programming (Slides),  Repeated Games with a Long Run and Short Run Player,  Information in the Continuous Time Limit

  1. Fudenberg, D., D. M. Kreps and E. Maskin [1990]: "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, 57: 555-573

Reputation Models

NOTES: Reputation Models Bad Reputation

  1. Backus, D. and J. Driffil [1985]: "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, 75: 530-538
  2. Ely, J. and J. Valimaki [2002]: "Bad Reputation," NAJ Economics, 4: 2
  3. Ely, J., D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine [2008]: "When is Reputation Bad," Games and Economic Behavior, 63: 498-526
  4. Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1989]: "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, 57: 759-778
  5. Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1992]: "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, 59: 561-580
  6. Kreps, D. and R. Wilson [1982]: "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 50: 253-79
  7. Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts [1982]: "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, 50: 443-60
  8. Schmidt, K. [1991]: "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests," mimeo

Experimental Game Theory

NOTES: Experimental Economics, Altruism and Spite

  1. Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1997]: "Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 508-536
  2. Ledyard, J. [1995]: "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," in Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. J. Kagel and A. Roth, Princeton University Press: Princeton
  3. Levine, D. K. [1998]: "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Review of Economic Dynamics, 1: 593-622
  4. McKelvey, R. and T. Palfrey [1992]: "An experimental study of the centipede game," Econometrica, 60: 803-836
  5. Ochs, J. and A. E. Roth [1989]: "An experimental study of sequential bargaining," American Economic Review, 79: 355-384
  6. Roth, A. E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and S. Zamir [1991]: "Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study," American Economic Review, 81: 1068-1095

Evolution and Learning in Games

NOTES:  Learning, Universal Consistency, Evolution, Imitation Steady State Learning Preferences

BOOK: Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine, Theory of Learning in Games

  1. Foster, D. P. and P. Young [2006]: "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Wharton
  2. Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [2005]: "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, 96: 1449-1476
  3. Johnson, P., D. K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer [2001]: "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Journal of Economic Theory, 100: 1-22
  4. Kandori, M., G. Mailath and R. Rob [1993]: "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, 61: 27-56

Global Games

NOTES:  Global Games

  1. Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme [1993]: "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, 61: 989-1018
  2. Morris, S. and H. S. Shin [2001]: "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Yale

Private Information in General Equilibrium

NOTES:  Lotteries and Sunspots

  1. Kehoe, T. J. and D. K. Levine [2001]: "Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets," Econometrica, 69: 575-598
  2. Kehoe, T. J., D. K. Levine and E. Prescott [2002]: "Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, 107: 39-69

Other Topics:

Repeated Games

NOTES:  Repeated Games

  1. Abreu, D., P. K. Dutta and L. Smith [1994]: "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, 62: 939-948
  2. Ely, J. C., J. Horner and W. Olszewski [2003]: "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Northwestern University
  3. Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin [1986]: "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 54: 533-54
  4. Kandori, M. [1992]: "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, 59: 61-80
  5. Sannikov, Y. [2005]: "Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time," UC Berkeley

Repeated Games with Moral Hazard

NOTES:  Moral Hazard Version

  1. Abreu, D., P. K. Dutta and L. Smith [1994]: "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, 62: 939-948
  2. Ely, J. C., J. Horner and W. Olszewski [2003]: "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Northwestern University
  3. Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin [1986]: "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 54: 533-54
  4. Kandori, M. [1992]: "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, 59: 61-80
  5. Sannikov, Y. [2005]: "Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time," UC Berkeley

Bargaining