Economic Sociology and
                Political Economy
            
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http://www.floatingpath.com/2012/02/20/buying-elections-newer-trend/
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            Levine, D. K. and S. Modica [2016]: "Size,
              Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations"